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Act 331 of 1984, the long-awaited revision of the law of obligations,'
took effect on January 1, 1985. Naturally, in the following 1985 session
the Legislature did not undertake to make significant changes in this
area. One of the few modifications, however, is worthy of mention.
Act 222 of 1985, amending and reenacting article 2593 of the Civil
Code, provides as follows: "Lesion can be alleged only by the vendor
in no other sale than one of corporeal immovables." This language was
placed in the special rules of lesion, contained in section 2 of Chapter
8,2 Title VII, Book III of the Civil Code, because former article 1862,
as amended,' was eliminated in Act 331 of 1984. But nothing is changed
by the added limitation in new article 2593, that a plea of lesion is
available only with respect to the sale of corporeal immovables, for this
position consistently has been recognized in the jurisprudence. 4
Last year in this portion of the symposium5 mention was made of
section 10 of Act 331 of 1984 which was added by the Senate Committee
on Judiciary A to reenact Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:3921.
This amendment, presumably was intended to negate legislatively the
indemnity action of an employer against an employee when the employer
is required to pay a third person damages for the tortious conduct of
an employee, under article 2320 of the Civil Code, when the employee
has been released by the injured creditor. 6 Since the constitutionality of
La. R.S. 9:3921 was raised, comment was deferred until litigation de-
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1. For a critique of selected portions of Act 331 of 1984, see The 1984 Revision
of the Louisiana Civil Code's Articles on Obligations-A Student Symposium, 45 La. L.
Rev. 747-829 (1985).
2. "Of the Resolution and of the Rescission of the Sale."
3. 1978 La. Acts No. 728.
4. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924).
5. Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Obligations, 45 La. L. Rev. 447,
447-48 (1985).
6. Id.
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veloped the issue. Predictably, the question arose quickly, but it ap-
parently has not been resolved. In Comeaux v. Roy, 7 the third circuit
had the following to say about the newly added statute:
Since R.S. 9:3921 was neither in effect at the time the subro-
gation agreements were executed nor at the time of trial on the
merits, we believe it would be fundamentally unfair for this
Court to consider this issue without allowing the parties an
opportunity to relitigate this matter at the trial level, with leave
being granted to all parties to file such amended pleadings and
adduce such additional evidence as they deem necessary.'
Apparently, even the beginnings of the final report of paragraph B of
La. R.S. 9:3921 will have to wait until next year.
JURISPRUDENCE
Again during the past judicial year, the reported opinions touched
upon a range of issues: error as a vice of consent, 9 contract formation, 0
compromises," compensation, 2 stipulations pour autrui, 3 conditions, 4
7. 469 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
8. Id. at 481.
9. See, e.g., Security Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. Terrell, 459 So. 2d 131 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1984) (A contract may be invalidated for unilateral error offact regarding motive
for formation when the other party knew or should have known of this motive for the
consent to the agreement.); Hoffman v. Craftworld Int'l, Inc., 463 So. 2d 89, 92 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985) (same).
10. See, e.g., Johnston-v. Johnston, 469 So. 2d 31, 32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985)
(When the "parties intend to reduce their negotiations to writing, they are not bound
until the contract is reduced to writing and signed by them. Even if all terms of the
alleged contract have been verbally agreed upon, so long as it is a part of the bargain
that the contract be reduced to writing, no valid contract exists until it is reduced to writing.").
11. See, e.g., Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985); Cheramie v.
Vegas, 468 So. 2d 810, 812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) ("A compromise agreement ...
needs no other cause than a desire to adjust differences and put to rest all possibility of
litigation.") (citing K.G. Farms, Inc. v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 402 So.
2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981)); Williamson & Diese Serv. Station Corp., 465 So. 2d
186, 188 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (A compromise or transaction takes on the authority
of the thing adjudged; it may not be challenged for error of law, for lesion, or on the
basis that a party did not receive everything to which he may have been entitled.); Watkins
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 458 So. 2d 212, 215 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) (similar holding);
Elder Forest Prod., Inc. v. B & F Lumber & Supply Co., 458 So. 2d 644, 645-46 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1984) (Although the doctrine of res judicata is usually considered in connection
with things judicially adjudged, the doctrine is of equal force when a transaction has
been perfected by the parties.) (citing Thompson v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
422 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Hancock v. Lincoln American Life Ins. Co.,
278 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 754 (La. 1973); Beilewicz
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novation, 5 subrogation,' 6 contribution and indemnification,7 fraud, 8
v. Rudisill, 201 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967)); Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins.
Co. v. Electro Corp., 461 So. 2d 410, 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (same).
12. See, e.g., Gautreau v. Southern Milk Sales, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985) (for compensation to operate, the debts must be equally liquidated
and demandable; a contested debt is not a liquidated one and cannot be used as a basis
for compensation.) (citing Hartley v. Hartley, 349 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1977)); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Cloy Constr. Co., 463 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984);
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 460 So. 2d 663,
673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
13. See, e.g., Arrow Trucking Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 691, 698 (La.
1985) (For a person to maintain successfully an action under a contract to which he is
not a party, "the contract must clearly express the contracting parties' intent to stipulate
some advantage for that (third) person.") (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1890 & 1902 (1870);
Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty Co., 258 La. 671, 247 So. 2d 572 (1971); Teacher's
Retirement Sys. of La. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d 193
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 456 So. 2d 594 (La. 1984)).
14. See, e.g., Holley v. Singletary, 464 So. 2d 410, 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985)
(The law of Louisiana does not permit the common law conditional sales contract for
movables; the parties cannot agree that the vendor will retain title until the full payment
of the price, for the seller is divested of ownership of the movable when the purchaser
is obligated to pay the price); Jones v. Jones, 459 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1984) (A compromise providing that the former husband was obligated to pay a
specific sum in alimony until the remarriage of the former wife was not an invalid
potestative condition because the future and uncertain event (remarriage) was within the
control of the obligee (former wife)); Moss v. Guarisco, 459 So. 2d 1, 5 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1984) ("The law does not permit a party whose obligation depends on a condition
to allege as a defense the non-fulfillment of the condition where the failure of the condition
was caused through his fault.") (citing George W. Garing Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226
La. 117, 75 So. 2d 28 (1954)).
15. See, e.g., Dunaway v. Spain, 468 So. 2d 771, 774-75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985);
Wiger v. Meyer, 459 So. 2d 117, 119-20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
16. See, e.g., Comeaux v. Roy, 469 So. 2d 478, 480-81 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985);
Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Texaco, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1141, 1142-44 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985); Jilek v. Covert, 465 So. 2d 102, 103-04 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); Independent
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kline, 454 So. 2d 418, 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Sellers v. Siligman, 463 So. 2d 697, 700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985):
Under tort circumstances, the question of whether the affair "concerns" only
one of the solidary co-debtors in the sense of [former] article 2106 is the same
as the question of whether one's negligence was actual and the other's only
constructive, in which case tort indemnity is owed by one to the other. . . . In
other words, in order to support a claim for tort indemnity, it must be said
that the one's negligence caused some injury to the other for which the other
is only liable on theoretical grounds. . . . Therefore, under Louisiana law, a
party who is actually negligent or actually at fault cannot recover tort indemnity.
See also Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H. Constr. Co., 459 So. 2d 1273,
1276 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
18. See, e.g., Stern v. Kreeger Store, Inc., 463 So. 2d 709, 711 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984).
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solidarity, 9 specific performance,20 and interpretation of agreements.2'
The more significant decisions are collected and surveyed in this selection.
Consent: The Touchstone of Contract Formation and Contract
Dissolution
Under article 1811 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, offers to
contract were acceptable either expressly or impliedly. 22 In addition,
silence and inaction were available to show an assent to create an
obligation. 23 These fundamental principles found in the Civil Code of
1870 were not changed by Act 331 of 1984.24
If conventional obligations may be formed by an express offer and
an implied acceptance or even silence or inaction as an acceptance, a
question would naturally arise whether or not an agreement may be
terminated mutually by an express declaration of an intent to extinguish
19. See, e.g., Fertitta, 462 So. 2d at 162-65; Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
459 So. 2d at 1276.
20. See, e.g., Pylate v. Inabnet, 458 So. 2d 1378, 1387 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984)
(When each party is at fault in causing the termination of a contract, neither is entitled
to specific performance of the terms of the agreement.).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Ly, 470 So. 2d 326, 328-29 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Acadiana
Health Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Sims-Smith
Ltd. v. Stokes, 466 So. 2d 480, 483-85 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Harkins v. Howard
Lumber Co., 460 So. 2d 772, 774 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); National Bench Advertising,
Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 458 So. 2d 179, 182 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) ("[Blecause
a court may not impute to the parties the use of language without meaning or effect,
some effect must be given to every word or clause in the contract.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 1811 (1870):
The proposition as well as the assent to a contract may be express or implied:
Express when evinced by words, either written or spoken;
Implied, when it is manifested by actions, even by silence or by inaction, in
cases in which they can from circumstances be supposed to mean, or by legal
presumption are directed to be considered as evidence of an assent.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1817 (1870):
Silence and inaction are also, under some circumstances, the means of showing
an assent that creates an obligation; if, after the termination of a lease, the
lessee continue in possession, and the lessor be inactive and silent, a complete
mutual obligation for continuing the lease, is 'created by the act of occupancy
of the tenant on the one side, and the inaction and silence of the lessor on
the other.
24. La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (1984) provides the following regarding consent:
A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer
and acceptance.
Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer
and acceptance may be made orally, in writing or by action or inaction that
under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.
Unless otherwise specified in the offer, there need not be conformity between
the manner in which the offer is made and the manner in which the acceptance
is made.
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the obligation followed with an implied assent to termination or even
silence and inaction. A few years ago, the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals supplied an affirmative answer to this query.2" Former
article 1901 of the Civil Code provided that agreements legally entered
into "can not be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties ...
*"26 Contractual consent, however, need not be verbalized; "[a] fortiori,
that which is sufficient to create a contractual obligation is sufficient
to dissolve it.'' 27 During the last year, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal, in Sims-Smith, Ltd. v. Stokes28 appeared to follow this lead.
Sims-Smith involved a disagreement regarding the services of the
defendant in assisting the plaintiff in operating a retail shop at Metairie,
Louisiana. The contract entered into between the litigants was for a six-
month term, commencing on October 21, 1984, and ending one hundred
and eighty days thereafter. One-half of the fee which the defendant
charged the plaintiff was paid upon the signing of the agreement, with
the balance due ninety days later. Problems developed thereafter shortly
between the parties; approximately two weeks before the balance of the
fee was to be paid, the plaintiff sent a letter advising the defendant
that the contract was to be considered at an end and that the plaintiff
wished a return on the monies already paid. The defendant received the
letter but did not respond.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, largely in favor of the
plaintiff, the fifth circuit concluded that the parties never entered into
a contract. Alternatively, the appellate panel concluded: "Defendant's
silence and inaction upon being informed that the contract was at an
end constituted an implied concurrence in its dissolution. ' ' 29 This decision
25. Allan v. Arnold, 673 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1982).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1983 continues the rule and states, in part, the following:
"Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the
consent of the parties or on the grounds provided by law." (Emphasis added.).
27. Allan, 673 F.2d at 770. The court supported its rationale in this fashion:
Our conclusion is based upon settled Louisiana law. "A written contract may
be modified or nullified by mutual consent of the parties." Watson v. Haik,
393 So.2d 173, 174 (La. App. 1980) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1901 and 1945;
Arceneaux v. Adams, 366 So.2d 1025 (La. App. 1978)). See Prisock v. Boyd,
199 So.2d 373 (La. App. 1967). "And a written contract may be modified by
oral agreement, provided the original contract was not required to be in writing."
Hornsby v. Ray, 327 So.2d 146, 150 (La. App. 1976) (citing WWOM, Inc. v.
Grapes, 181 So.2d 289 (La. App. 1965)). Finally, the proposition that the
modification of a contract may be by implication, silence, or inaction," Bank
of Louisiana in New Orleans v. Campbell, 329 So.2d 235, 237 (La. App. 1976)
(citing Alliance Mfg. Co. v. Foti, 146 So.2d 464 (La. App. 1962)), is accepted
in Louisiana.
Id. at n.3.
28. 466 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 485.
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is eminently sensible and is completely in accord with the new rules
governing dissolution of contracts, articles 2013 through 2024 of the
Civil Code30 as amended by Act 331 of 1984.
Compromises and Solidarity
The spectre of the celebrated and much criticized decision of the
supreme court in Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte3
continues to cast an unfortunately ominous shadow upon both the law
of remission and solidarity. In this area, the last term of the supreme
court witnessed a confusing result, for questionable reasons, in the case
of Fertitta v. All State Insurance Co.32
The plaintiff, Mrs. Fertitta, was injured in a automobile accident
caused by the negligence of the driver of the other vehicle. Consequently,
Mrs. Fertitta instituted a law suit against the other driver, the liability
insurer of the tortfeasor, and her own automobile insurance company,
as the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) carrier. On the morning
of trial, Mrs. Fertitta entered into a compromise with her UM carrier
for $32,000. As a part of the transaction, the UM carrier "waived any
right to subrogation or other reimbursement in the event plaintiff re-
covered by judgment or settlement against other parties liable for her
30. New article 2022 particularly is germane: "Either party to a commutative contract
may refuse to perform his obligation if the other has failed to perform or does not offer
to perform his own at the same time, if the performances are due simultaneously." La.
Civ. Code arts. 2013, 2022, & 2024 additionally are worth noting. Under new
article 2024, "[a] contract of unspecified duration may be terminated at the will of either
party by giving notice, reasonable in time and form, to the other party." Good faith,
of course, must be exercised. La. Civ. Code art. 1983; La. Civ. Code art. 2024, comment
(e) ("In proceeding under this Article, the parties must comply with the overriding duty
of good faith. Reasonable advance notice will usually be required to avoid unwarranted
injury to the interest of the other party. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3). See also R.S. 32:1256.1
(dealing with automobile franchises).").
31. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975). See Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-
Security Devices, 41 La. L. Rev. 389, 390 (1981); Rubin, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Security Devices, 40 La. L. Rev. 437 (1976);
Harrell, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Security
Devices, 36 La. L. Rev. 437 (1976); Note, Green Garden: Short Shrift for the Solidary
Surety, 41 La. L. Rev. 968 (1981); Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict Resolved, A Conflict
Ignored, 40 La. L. Rev. 483 (1980); Note, Rights of the Solidary Surety: Louisiana Bank
& Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 La. L. Rev. 279 (1975); Note, Security Rights-Suretyship-
Release of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary Surety, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1187
(1975). If "[h]appiness is writing a symposium article on obligations and not having to
discuss solidarity," Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Obligations, 45 La.
L. Rev. 388, 390 (1982), this is not a year for joy and celebration. For one reason or
another, "[o]ver the years, solidarity has occupied the greatest portion of this subject in
the symposium." Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Obligations, 41 La. L.
Rev. 355 (1981). The echo of Professor Johnson's sentiments is heard again.
32. 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985).
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damages." 33 Trial on the merits continued against the negligent driver
and her liability insurer, resulting in a judgement in the amount of
$48,701.11 in favor of the plaintiff. The district court ruled that the
settlement by Mrs. Fertitta with her UM carrier had no effect on the
amount of judgment against the negligent driver and her insurance
carrier, "since uninsured motorist coverage was designed to benefit the
tort victim and not the tortfeasor. ' '34
The first circuit, relying upon Hoefly v. Government Employees
Insurance Co.," noted that Mrs. Fertitta's UM carrier was a solidary
obligor with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's liability insurer. 6 But,
according to the intermediate appellate panel, no solidary obligation
existed between the tortfeasor's insurer and the UM carrier until the
tortfeasor's insurer fulfilled all of its obligations, or payment of policy
limits.37 The UM carrier, therefore, was classified as an "excess insurer"
but "only because of its coverage over and above any protection of
the tortfeasor. ' ' 38 Without a solidary obligation in existence involving
the UM carrier and the tortfeasor's liability insurer, the intermediate
appellate court refused to credit the tortfeasor's insurer with payments
made by the UM carrier.3 9 The supreme court reversed.
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon the text of former
article 2091 of the Civil Code: "There is an obligation in solido on the
part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing, so
that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which
is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.""
33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. See 439 So. 2d 531, 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (citing Strauss v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 So. 2d 982 (La. 1982)).
35. 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982). See Note, Obligations-Uninsured Motorist and Insurer
as Obligors in Solido, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 642 (1983).
36. 439 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 535.
38. Id. at 534-35.
39. As a matter of policy, "[in a choice of a windfall either to the liability insurer
or the injured party, we choose to elect the latter." Id. From a legal perspective, the
court's summary of Hoefly is perceptive:
Hoefly held that tortfeasors and uninsured motorist carriers are solidary obligors
as to the injured party, and that payment by one should exonerate the other
from the creditor as to the solidary obligation. The Supreme Court cautioned,
however, that although solidarily bound for the creditor's benefit, a tortfeasor
and an uninsured motorist carrier might have differing relationships among
themselves.
Id. at 534.
40. (Emphasis added.) While it has been said that "[ilt is the co-extensive obligation
for the 'same thing' (and not the source of liability) which creates the solidarity of the
obligation," Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 459 So. 2d at 1276 (citing Narcise v.
Illinois Central R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1983)), "[olne decision that has not been
19861
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In other words, "when the liability is solidary, the creditor cannot collect
more than the full amount of the debt for the single or combined
payments of the debtors. Therefore, solidarity is not inconsistent with
the purpose of providing full recovery to the tort victim." '4I As a matter
of mathematics, Justice Lemmon, writing for the court, determined "that
the $32,000 payment on the solidary obligation . . . must be imputed
to the debt owed by ... the other solidary obligor[s]. ' '42 - Only Chief
Justice Dixon dissented, on the ground that the majority allowed solidary
debtors to plead division, 43 notwithstanding former article 2094 of the
Civil Code."
Amazingly, no mention is made in the majority opinion of old
article 2203 of the Civil Code, 4 which, in full, reads as follows:
The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of the
co-debtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor
has expressly reserved his right against the latter.
In the latter case, he cannot claim the debt without making a
deduction of the part of him to whom he has made the re-
mission. 6
made in Louisiana Jurisprudence is precisely how the existence of solidarity will be
determined." Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma,
41 La. L. Rev. 659, 677 (1981) [hereafter cited as Prescribing Solidarity]. Two methods
appear in the reported decisions for identifying obligations in solido:
lT]he court may decide that an obligation is solidary because all debtors are
bound for the same thing to the same creditor, who may collect the whole debt
from anyone. This "principal effects" standard classifies an obligation as solidary
because it matches article 2091's definition of solidarity. Or, the court may
decide that solidarity exists when its secondary effects, e.g., the interruption of
prescription or the right of contribution, apply to the parties.
Comment, Prescribing Solidarity, supra, at 677.
41. 462 So. 2d at 163.
42. Id. at 164.
43. Id. at 165 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2094 (1870): "The creditor of an obligation contracted in
solido may apply to any one of the debtors he pleases, without the debtor's having a
right to plead the benefit of division."
45. This omission is surprising especially in view of the court's devotion of a part
of its opinion to a discussion of former article 2206 of the Civil Code, treating imputation
of payments received from sureties, since it is contained in the same section of the Code-
Section 3 of Chapter 5, Title IV, Book III, entitled "Of the Remission of the Debt."
46. The author has commented previously on the workings of former article 2203.
Schewe, supra note 5, at 453-55; Comment, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidarity
Rejoinder, 41 La. L. Rev. 1279 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tilting Against Windmills]; Com-
ment, Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 40. But perhaps no writer has contributed
as much to this field as H. Alston Johnson Ill. Johnson, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Obligations, 42 La. L. Rev. 388, 390-97 (1982); Johnson, Developments in
the Law, 1979-1980-Obligations, 41 La. L. Rev. 355, 355-58 (1981); Johnson, The Work
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After identifying the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor's insurer, and the UM
carrier as solidary obligors in favor of the plaintiff,47 the court should have
applied the second paragraph of the former article 2203 in Feritta v. All State
Insurance Co. Thus, the court should have determined what part of the debt
was owed by the solidary obligor released, the UM carrier. In answer to this
problem, at lest three solutions are possible: (1) a dollar for dollar deduction,
the method chosen by the court;48 (2) no deduction, the argument voiced by
the plaintiff, considering the released solidary debtor an accessory obligor
within the meaning of former article 2106;49 or (3) a deduction of one-third,
simply by counting heads.
Many good arguments may be made in favor of adopting the second
proposed solution. 0 For one, it really cannot be disputed that the true
debtor is the tortfeasor, who holds no right of contribution from either
the liability insurer or the UM carrier, the other solidary debtors. Ac-
cordingly, the settlement should have no effect upon the amount of the
debt owed by the tortfeasor since the UM carrier elected to forego its
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Obligations, 36 La. L. Rev.
375, 375-82 (1976); Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-
1974 Term-Obligations, 35 La. L. Rev. 280, 291-98 (1975); Johnson, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Obligations, 34 La. L. Rev. 231,
231-37 (1974). Professor Johnson's works should be considered required reading.
47. This was the holding in Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d
575 (La. 1982).
48. 462 So. 2d at 163-64. A handful of dated decisions support this solution. See,
e.g., Cormier v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 159 So. 2d 746, 751-53 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 169 So. 2d 69 (La. 1964); Wilson v. Scrulock Oil Co., 126 So. 2d
429, 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Rice v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 114 So. 2d 92, 96-
97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Lewis v. Travelers Indem. Co., 81 So. 2d 178, 180-81 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1955). But these opinions, plainly, are out of synch with the weight of
authority in this state.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 2106 (1870): "If the affair for which the debt has been
contracted in solido concern only one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for
the whole debt towards the other co-debtors, who, with regard to him, are considered
only as his securities." Recent commentary on the subject abounds. Schewe, supra note
5, at 460-63: Johnson, Recent Developments in the Law, 1980-81 -Obligations, 42 La.
L. Rev. 388, 390-97 (1982); Comment, Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 46, at 1287; Com-
ment, Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 40.
50. It may be said, for example, that the release of the UM carrier is the converse
of the situation in Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La.
1975), when the creditor compromised with the principal debtor and purported to reserve
rights against the accessory obligors, solidary sureties. Truly, in the sense of former article
2106 of the Civil Code, the full debt is owed by the principal obligor, the tortfeasor in
Fertitta. The release of the UM carrier, therefore, should not benefit the tortfeasor. See
Comment, Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 46, at 1287-94.
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claim for reimbursement, via subrogation," from the tortfeasor for the
sums it paid to the plaintiff. This second choice, theoretically cogent
and practically fair,52 however, was discussed and rejected by the court.
Given a contest between alternative one, which the court ultimately
adopted, and scenario three, it seems that the court should have chosen
to adopt a more reasonable and legally more palatable view. The courts
have not hesitated in counting solidary debtors by heads and deducting
the fraction of the released obligors from the debt in applying former
article 2203 of the Civil Code. 3 And, even aside from the prior authority
for proposal three, as opposed to solution one, deducting one-third of
the debt owed to the plaintiff (or $16,071.37) is more compatible with
the definition of a transaction or compromise: "An agreement between
two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit,
adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they
agree on, and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining,
balanced by the danger of losing."5 4
51. In the contract of compromise, the UM carrier "waived any right to subrogation
or other reimbursement in the event plaintiff recovered by judgment or settlement against
other parties liable for her damages." 462 So. 2d at 161.
52. In a similar context, Professor Johnson has asked "[wihat public policy is ...
served by insulating the wrofigdoer," the tortfeasor? Johnson, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Obligations, 42 La. L. Rev. 388, 396 (1982).
53. See, e.g., Wisconsin Capital Corp. v. Transworld Land Title Corp., 378 So. 2d
495, 498 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Swanson v. Comeaux, 286 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), aff'd, 296 So. 2d 267 (La. 1974). In Swanson, the court held the plaintiff's
UM carrier liable in solido with George Comeaux for the injuries caused by a tort
committed by Steven Comeaux, Mr. Comeaux's minor son. In a per curiam opinion on
an application for rehearing, the court, after recognizing that the UM carrier and George
Comeaux were solidarily liable, even though the obligation of one (the UM carrier) arose
ex contractu and the liability of the other (Mr. Comeaux) arose ex delicto (under articles
237, 2317, and 2318 of the Civil Code), held the UM carrier to be entitled to full
indemnity, not merely contribution for a proportionate share, under former article 2106:
The thrust of the applicant's complaint on this issue directs itself to the question
of whether it is bound to seek contribution only for its proportionate share of
whatever judgment it may pay. However, the provisions of Article 2103 relating
to division into proportionate shares between the co-debtors is not applicable
to the situation here. We have already referred to the provisions of Article 2092
wherein there is a different obligation between the debtors as to the payment,
and additionally we refer to LSA-C.C. Article 2106, and those portions of LSA-
R.S. 22:1406 applying to uninsured motorists coverage. We are of the opinion
that these codal and statutory authorities show that as between the co-debtors
here cast in judgment, the obligation is not simply that each is required to pay a pro-
portionate part of the judgment to the other after payment of the judgment to the
creditor, but that the obligation is that if the insurer pays any part of the judgment,
it is entitled to full recovery from the other judgment debtor. Landry v. Adam, 282
So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
286 So. 2d at 127 (emphasis added).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 3071.
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In Fertitta, when the UM carrier settled with the plaintiff, paying
$32,000, it was speculation to venture what sum the plaintiff would be
awarded in a judgment. In hindsight, clearly the plaintiff, Mrs. Fertitta,
negotiated a favorable compromise with the UM carrier, but she, iron-
ically, was penalized for it. If the court determined that the part of
the solidary debt owed by the UM carrier was one-third of the obligation,
the result reached by simply counting the number of debtors, then the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $48,701.11 against
the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer would have been reduced to
$32,483.64, not to $16,701.11. The reduction of merely one-third makes
sense when the contract of compromise between the plaintiff and the
UM carrier is likened to one aleatory in nature."
A deduction of one-third of the solidary obligation is fair in op-
eration even if the plaintiff recovers more than triple the settled-for
amount. For example, if the plaintiff had received a judgment of $150,000,
then she properly would have be entitled to collect only 100,000 from
the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer. The part of the solidary debt
owed by the released obligor, the UM carrier, remains the same, one-
third, which is $50,000 in this hypothetical situation. Admittedly, the
plaintiff would recover more, $118,000, if only a dollar for dollar credit
were given the unreleased solidary obligors, but that is a danger and a
risk inherent in contracts of compromise and should be viewed as
accepted by the parties to the transaction.5 6
It seems difficult to believe that the final chapter and verse has
been written on the issues raised in Fertitta. The language found in new
article 1803 of the Civil Code supports a conclusion different from the
one reached by the supreme court in this case: "Remission of the debt
by the obligee in favor of one obligor, or a transaction or compromise
between the obligee and one obligor, benefits the other solidary obligors
in the amount of the portion of that obligor."' 57 Accordingly, a reev-
55. La. Civ. Code art. 1912; La. Civ Code art. 1776 (1870). According to
comment (e) to new article 1912 of the Civil Code: "A contract may be aleatory not
only because of its nature, but also because of the intention of the parties. Thus, an
insurance contract is unquestionably aleatory as the risk involved is inherent in the nature
of the contract. It is the same in the case of a wager." Really, a contract of compromise
entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant to end a personal injury lawsuit is a
type of wager: the defendant is awarding the plaintiff some money to dismiss the possibility
of a court awarding more, although a chance of a smaller judgment exists as well; and
the plaintiff is accepting the compensation, balancing the hope of a larger recovery against
the risk of receiving less.
56. Article 3078 of the Civil Code provides, in part: "Transactions have, between
the interested parties, a force equal to the authority of things adjudged. They cannot be
attacked on account of any error in law or any lesion." (Emphasis added.)
57. (Emphasis added.) The problem, of course, remains in calculating the amount of
the portion of the solidary debt owned by the obligor released. While this question is
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aluation is in order for the holding of and the reasoning in Fertitta v.
All State Insurance Co.
Compensation
The decision of the first circuit in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
v. Cloy Construction Co.5" is noteworthy in that the court identified
"three kinds of set-off or compensation: legal, which is effected by
operation of law; contractual, which is effected by the will of the parties;
and, judicial, which is effected by the courts." 5 9 For this proposition,
the court relied upon former articles 2207, 2208, and 2209 of the Civil
Code and Tolbird v. Cooper,60 a decision rendered by the supreme court
in 1962. While it may be incorrect to identify as a type of compensation
one effected by the will of the parties 6 it may be useful to note that
judicial compensation, in reality, is no more than a practice of shaping
final judgements, and is invoked when compensation as a matter of law
is not operable. As stated by the court in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. Clay Construction Co., "[jiudicial compensation takes place
when a court decides two parties are mutually indebted to each other
and adjusts the amounts owed in fixing the judgment." ' 62 Since this
form of compensation is triggered after a previously unliquidated debt
not resolved in Comment, A Riddle of Solidarity: The Release of One Solidary Obligor,
45 La. L. Rev. 771 (1985), the work is commended for review.
58. 463 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1368.
60. 243 La. 306, 143 So. 2d 80 (1962). The following quotation from Planiol was
relied upon by Justice Hawthorne in Tolbird:
There is judicial compensation when a debtor who is sued for the execution of
a debt filed a reconventional demand against the plaintiff pleading a credit in
opposition to the original demand, which credit does not have or fulfill the
conditions required for legal compensation. It may be, for example, that the
credit claimed in the reconventional demand is not liquidated; or it may be the
result of damages caused by the plaintiff to the defendant-damages that must
be evaluated in order to fix the amount of the indemnity due. But the judge,
having jurisdiction of the demand, can make such evaluation, and by the same
judgment fix the amount of the damages and effect the compensation. The
original defendant will simply be ordered to pay the excess over his own debt;
it may even happen that he may obtain judgment for the difference, if the
indemnity which is due him exceeds what he owes the plaintiff.
243 La. at 318, 143 So. 2d at 84 (quoting M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, no.
562, at 325 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959)).
61. The essence of compensation, a method by which obligations are extinguished,
is its operation as a matter of law. Former article 2208 of the Civil Code provided that
"[c]ompensation takes place of course by the mere operation of law, even unknown to
the debtors; the two debts are reciprocally extinguished, as soon as they exist simulta-
neously, to the amount of their respective sums." The substance of this principle is
reproduced in new article 1893 of the Civil Code.
62. 463 So. 2d at 1369 (emphasis in original).
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or an obligation of a contested sum has been liquidated or fixed, often
the situation when a plaintiff brings a petition and a defendant presents
a reconventional demand, the jurisprudential gloss upon the Civil Code61
expands the concept of compensation greatly.
Subrogation
The problems of uninsurance/underinsurance troubled the bench not
only in the area of solidarity during the past year but in the context
of subrogation as well.Y Since the decision of the supreme court in
Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 65 a UM carrier has been
able to become subrogated conventionally, primarily pursuant to a stand-
ard clause contained in policies, to its insured's rights against the un-
insured tortfeasor.6 The following year, however, the supreme court
announced, in Pace v. Cage,67 that an uninsured/underinsured carrier
may not be subrogated to the rights of its insured after the insured has
released the tortfeasor. Quite logically, the court stated that "at the
time the uninsured motorist carrier made payment to the insured the
insured had no rights against the former debtor to subrogate to the
insurer.' '68 Both Bond and Pace addressed conventional subrogations. 69
In view of the supreme court's holding in Hoefly v. Government
Employees Insurance Co. 70 that the UM carrier is liable solidarily with
the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer in favor of the plaintiff, a
63. See supra note 61.
64. Several years ago Professor Johnson noted in this forum that "[mlotorcycle riding
can be hazardous to the consistency of the law." Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Obligations, 36 La. L. Rev. 375, 375 (1976).
Perhaps an appropriate update on his remark is to say uninsurance/underinsurance motorist
carrier issues are wreaking havoc on the law of obligations. The cases of Fertitta, 462
So. 2d 159, Jilek, 465 So. 2d 102, Hoefly, 41F So. 2d 575, Pace, 419 So. 2d 443, Bond
v. Commercial Union Assurance Co, 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981), and Niemann v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979), are recent illustrations. An excellent review of the
law of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is found in McKenzie, Louisiana Un-
insured Motorist Coverage-After Twenty Years, 43 La. L. Rev. 691 (1983).
65. 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981).
66. See infra note 69.
67. 419 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982).
68. Id. at 444.
69. Oddly, the issue of legal subrogation of an insurer to the rights of its insured
against a tortfeasor upon payment of the claim of the insured is not only a mystery in
the law of Louisiana but is mired in a Serbonian bog, using the inimatable prose of
Justice Cardozo, Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499, 54 S.
Ct. 461, 463 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Professor Johnson waxed eloquent on the
subject in this symposium a few years ago, and his thoughts are recommended. Johnson,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Obligations, 39
La. L. Rev. 675, 675-85 (1979).
70. 418 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982).
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resolution seemed near of the longstanding dispute, whether or not
insurers are entitled to subrogation as a matter of law under former
article 2161 or new article 1829 of the Civil Code.7 While all confusion
in this area has not been removed, the case of Jilek v. Covert72 at least
raised and resolved a question unanswered in Pace - whether or not
the insured's release of the tortfeasor precludes the UM carrier from
claiming legal subrogation to the rights of its insured to pursue the
tortfeasor. The answer supplied by the fourth circuit, with Chief Judge
Redmann authoring the opinion, is legally sound: "Subrogation is sub-
rogation ... whether conventional or legal, it does no more than place
the person subrogated into the position of the original creditor. 7 3 As
a result,
the paying UM carrier has nothing more than subrogation to the tort
victim's claim. Where, as here, the tort victim has already released
the tortfeasor, the UM carrier's subrogation upon payment will not
enable it to recover the tort victim's claim against the tortfeasor be-
cause that claim has been released. 74
Although undeniably correct, the decision of the Jilek court highlights
the need for legislation on this subject. The UM carrier should not have
to pay all of the claims of its insured, while the tortfeasor and, possibly,
the tortfeasor's liability insurer pay nothing, if indeed the policy of this
state is to require meaningful liability insurance of all drivers. 5
71. La. Civ. Code art. 1829 treats legal subrogation:
Subrogation takes place by operation of law:
(I) In favor of an obligee who pays another obligee whose right is preferred
to his because of a privilege, pledge, or mortgage;
(2) In favor of a purchaser of movable or immovable property who uses the
purchase money to pay creditors holding any privilege, pledge, or mortgage on
the property;
(3) In favor of an obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or for others
and who has recourse against those others as a result of the payment;
(4) In favor of an heir with benefit of inventory who pays debts of the estate with
his own funds; and
(5) In the other cases provided by law.
See Schewe, supra note 5, at 455-60.
72. 465 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 103 (citations omitted). See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tadlock, 420 So. 2d 548,
549 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). ("It is well settled that a subrogee can have no greater
rights than the subrogor and acquires only those rights held by the subrogor as of the
time of payment.").
74. 465 So. 2d at 104.




As noted last year, 76 the means for distinguishing between contracts
of sale and construction agreements have been disputed and have never
been very clear. During the past term, the issues significant for properly
identifying a contract as one of sale or of another kind were raised in
two reported opinions worth mentioning.
In Acadiana Health Club, Inc. v. Hebert,77 the plaintiff commenced
a lawsuit seeking, among other things, rescission of a contract for the
installation of carpet in its place of business. One of the defendants,
Dallas Hebert, agreed to install carpet chosen by a part-owner of Aca-
diana Health Club. Soon after the carpet was laid a number of seams
began to open. Consequently, on several occasions, employees of defend-
ant Dallas Hebert made repairs. More than a year after Dallas Hebert
finished the work, the plaintiff commenced the action for rescission of
the contract. The question of prescription, naturally, was crucial for
the court's determination.7 8 In this regard, the following statements by
the court are noteworthy:
There are three major factors in determining whether a contract
is a contract of sale or a contract to build or to work by the
job. First, in a contract to build, the "purchaser" has some
control over the specifications of the object. Second, the ne-
gotiations in a contract to build take place before the object is
constructed. Lastly, and most importantly, a building contract
contemplates not only that the builder will furnish the materials,
but that he will also furnish his skill and labor in order to build
the desired object.7 9
76. Schewe, supra note 5, at 456. See Hunt v. Suares, 9 La. 434 (1836); FMC Corp.
v. Continental Grain Co., 355 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Jefferson Parish
School Bd. v. Rowley Co., 350 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Henson v. Gonzalez,
326 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Vico Concrete Co. v. Antley, 283 So. 2d 830
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy, 239 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970); S. Litvinoff, Sale and Lease in the Louisiana Jurisprudence 1-22 (1983); Levasseur,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Sales, 39 La. L.
Rev. 705, 709-15 (1979).
77. 469 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
78. If the contract is considered to be one of sale, then the rules of the Civil Code
treating redhibition, "Of the Vices of the Thing Sold," would likely apply with a truncated
period of prescription. In this respect, article 2534 of the Civil Code states, in part, as
follows: "The redhibitory action must be instituted within a year, at the farthest, comm-
encing from the date of the sale. The limitation does not apply where the seller had
knowledge of the vice and neglected to declare it to the purchaser."
79. 469 So. 2d at 1189 (citing Airco Refrig. Serv. Inc. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So.
2d 880 (1961); Duhon v. Three Friends Homebuilders Corp., 396 So. 2d 559 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1981)).
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In the matter at hand, the court concluded that while the plaintiff did
not make specific requests regarding the carpet itself, it did have con-
siderable input. The object of the contract "was not simply the sale of
so many feet of carpet and flooring, but the job of carpeting and
flooring the health club facilities." 0 Finally, and most importantly,
Dallas Hebert's employees were called upon to use their skill in installing
the carpeting. The court, therefore, reasoned that the contract between
the plaintiff and Dallas Hebert was a construction agreement. This
conclusion is sound under the existing jurisprudence"' and is well-rea-
soned.
In a somewhat different context, the case of Harkins v. Howard
Lumber Co."2 illustrates an attempt to delineate between a redhibitory
defect in a thing sold, a matter covered by the law of sales, and a
breach of the obligation of a vendor to provide the purchaser with the
precise thing requested, a claim not subject to the prescription of one
year under article 2534 of the Civil Code. 3 Mr. Harkins commenced
his lawsuit against Howard Lumber Company requesting damages for
the defendant's having allegedly sold defective redwood siding. After
trial, the district court awarded judgement in favor of the plaintiff. On
appeal, Howard Lumber Company filed an exception of prescription,
insisting that the plaintiff's claim was in redhibition and that it had
prescribed, since the siding was purchased in April of 1979 and the suit
was not filed until February 24, 1981. In rejecting this argument, the
third circuit refused to view the problem before it as involving a "de-
fective" product. The court explained itself in this fashion:
It is rather a situation where the seller promised to supply a
product of a certain quality but instead delivered a product of
a lesser quality. The testimony adduced at trial and the purchase
invoice shows that the siding purchased was to be a "clear
grade" of redwood siding. "Clear grade" is a term used by the
industry to rank siding as to its quality, i.e., streaking, knot
holes, etc. The record firmly establishes that the siding delivered
to the plaintiff was not of a clear grade but was rather of an
inferior grade; therefore, the contract was breached. The plaintiff
has a cause of action to rescind the contract based upon this
error regardless of any action sounding in redhibition because
of the "defective" nature of the product. Accordingly, the plain-
80. 469 So. 2d at 1189.
81. See supra note 76.
82. 460 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
83. See supra note 78.
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tiff's cause of action is governed by a ten year prescriptive
period. 4
In supporting the position of the court, Judge Domengeaux, the author
for the panel, relied upon former article 1931 of the Civil Code, 5 prior
jurisprudence, 6 and scholarly commentary.87 While the decision in Har-
kins is undeniably correct, more direct support exists for the result.
Since a contract of sale of a movable is perfected upon consent of
the parties regarding the thing and the price,88 the obligation of the
vendor, in this instance Howard Lumber Company, to deliver the item
purchased is controlled by articles 2477 through 2499 of the Civil Code, 9
not the general rules of obligations." And claims arising under Section
19' of Chapter 6, Title VII, Book III of the Civil Code prescribe only
after the passage of ten years. Because, therefore, the properly invoked
rules contained in Title VII-"Of Sale"--concern the tradition or the
delivery of the thing sold, not the vices of the thing sold, the plaintiff's
action against the defendant had not prescribed.
84. 460 So. 2d at 774 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 3544 (1870)). See La. Civ. Code
art. 3499.
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1931 (1870): "A contract may be violated, either actively by
doing something inconsistent with the obligation it has proposed or passively by not doing
what Was covenanted to be done, or not doing it at the time, or in a manner stipulated
or implied from the nature of the contract." See La. Civ. Code art. 1994.
86. People's Water Serv. Co. of La. v. Menge Pump & Mach. Co., 452 So. 2d 752,
754-55 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 So. 2d 1391 (La. 1984) (citing PPG Indus.
v. Industrial Laminates, 664 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1982); Vico Concrete Co. v. Antley, 283
So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Victory Oil Co. v. Perret, 183 So. 2d 360 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966)).
87. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 158, at 291, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
88. La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
89. "The tradition or delivery is the transferring of the thing sold into the power and pos-
session of the buyer." La. Civ. Code art. 2477. In the event the vendor fails to deliver the thing
sold, "the seller is liable to damages, if there result any detriment to the buyer,..."
La. Civ. Code art. 2486.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2438.
91. "Of the Tradition or Delivery of the Thing Sold."

